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Labor Unions

OLMS Remote Electronic-Voting Guidance: What Union Leaders Must Verify

By Votem Compliance Team·November 10, 2026

OLMS Remote Electronic-Voting Guidance: What Union Leaders Must Verify


The U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS) does not prohibit labor unions from running officer elections online, but it does not grant them a blank check, either. Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), every local labor organization must elect its officers by secret ballot among members in good standing, provide adequate safeguards for a fair election including candidate observer rights, and preserve all election records for at least one year. OLMS's official compliance guidance on remote electronic voting systems maps those statutory duties to the security, observability, and accessibility controls that a vendor-run election platform must actually deliver. This guide translates that guidance into a verification checklist your election committee can use before selecting, renewing, or renewing the terms with a voting provider.



How OLMS Approaches Remote Electronic Voting


The primary source for this topic is the OLMS Compliance Tip, Electing Union Officers Using Remote Electronic Voting Systems, issued by the U.S. Department of Labor in October 2016, revised technically in September 2019, and updated in December 2024. The guidance applies to remote electronic voting systems defined as electronic voting from remote computers via the internet and electronic voting from remote telephones. OLMS clarifies that it does not apply to polling-place electronic voting machines or to non-electronic ballots that are only counted electronically, such as optical-scan ballots.


Three foundational points govern how the guidance works in practice:



  • No single voting method is mandated. OLMS emphasizes that the LMRDA does not require a particular method or system of voting. Labor organizations may establish their own systems for officer elections, provided those systems comply with the Act. The statutory baseline comes from the LMRDA itself, including 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a), (b), and (d).

  • No safe harbor exists. The guidance does not lay out the only acceptable ways to comply, and following its suggestions does not immunize an election from challenge. OLMS investigates complaints filed under Title IV on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).

  • Statutory standards do not change. The secret-ballot standard of 29 U.S.C. § 402(k) and the observer-rights standard of 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) apply to remote electronic voting systems exactly as they do to paper ballots.



Pillar One: Preserving Ballot Secrecy


Section 3(k) of the LMRDA defines a secret ballot as a choice "cast in such a manner that the person expressing such choice cannot be identified with the choice expressed" (29 U.S.C. § 402(k)). OLMS acknowledges that some remote electronic systems create a persistent electronic link between a voter and their vote. The agency will not find that such a link alone violates the Act; instead, investigators examine whether the system used adequate protections to prevent unauthorized access to that link.


The guidance identifies several safeguards OLMS views favorably:



  • Permitting voting only through a secure portal, such as portals protected by multi-factor authentication.

  • Randomizing the order in which votes are stored in encrypted files so the tally reveals no information about casting order.

  • Ensuring voting credentials are never exposed on union or employer websites or in any other accessible manner.

  • Storing returned electronic ballots in encrypted files accessible only through the simultaneous use of multiple decryption keys distributed across a diverse group of actors, including candidate representatives and one or more neutrals, used solely to produce the official tally.

  • Employing safeguards that detect and log attempts to breach encrypted files or access individual voter choices.

  • Using technology that prevents ballot image capture and sharing, which mitigates the risk of vote buying, vote selling, and voter coercion.


For election committees, the practical takeaway is simple: request written documentation of each control from every candidate platform before contracting, and verify that the provider can demonstrate it in operation.



Pillar Two: Adequate Safeguards and Observer Rights


Section 401(c) requires unions to provide adequate safeguards for a fair election, "including the right of any candidate to have an observer at the polls and at the counting of the ballots" (29 U.S.C. § 481(c)). OLMS recognizes that electronic balloting cannot be observed in the same manner as a polling site or mail-ballot election, where observers watch credential handling, ballot opening, and the physical count (see also the mail-ballot observation rules at 29 CFR 452.107(c)). However, candidates must still receive a meaningful opportunity to verify that votes were cast by eligible members and accurately counted.


Controls OLMS views favorably under this pillar include:



  • Industry-standard encryption that protects ballots from casting through decryption and counting, with the encryption approach disclosed to observers.

  • Meaningful code verification through open-source code inspection by candidate observers (at their own cost) or a certified audit by a reputable third party. OLMS notes that it does not endorse any specific auditor or validate the code of any vendor.

  • Pre-election verification mechanisms, such as allowing observers to watch a test run on practice ballots to verify recording and tally accuracy.

  • System-generated alerts delivered to observers if tampering is attempted while the election is in progress.

  • The opportunity to observe the preparation and distribution of voting credentials, including replacement credentials, while keeping the credentials themselves secret.

  • The opportunity to observe every step required to count votes and to audit that process.

  • Detailed transaction logs with integrity protections, and periodic independent third-party system audits.

  • A written security policy specifying the security procedures for every system that will contact voter or vote information, providing reference documentation for auditors and regulatory bodies.


Union officers preparing an election should also review the OLMS Guide for Conducting Local Union Officer Elections and the agency's election compliance assistance resources to align platform controls with the full LMRDA election lifecycle, from nomination notices through post-election challenges.



Pillar Three: Preserving Election Records


Under 29 U.S.C. § 481(e), ballots and all other records pertaining to the election must be preserved for one year following the election. OLMS explicitly lists what the electronic archive must include: the electronic votes and any paper versions, eligibility lists, voting credentials, log files, time-stamped software code used to run the system, encrypted ballot files protected in the same manner as during the election, and tally results.


For systems that maintain a persistent voter-vote link, OLMS notes that it may be desirable for a union to destroy the encrypted ballot files only after the later of one year or the conclusion of any Title IV investigation, litigation, or other applicable retention requirement. Your vendor contract should specify exactly who holds the complete archive, the export format, the integrity proofs attached to the logs, and the destruction schedule agreed upon in advance.



Pillar Four: Preserving the Right to Vote


The guidance sets two accessibility requirements that are directly within the union's operational control. First, the union must provide, upon request, union-provided internet access or an alternative voting method to any member who does not have access to the internet. Second, internet voting must be implemented in a manner that does not create barriers for individuals with accessibility needs.


In practice, this means evaluating whether the platform works with assistive technologies such as screen readers, testing keyboard navigation and contrast against recognized digital accessibility standards, and planning a clear support path for members who need credential reissuance or an alternate channel. A compliant election cannot assume universal high-speed internet access or identical digital literacy across the membership.



How Election Committees Should Apply the Guidance


For an election committee evaluating providers, the four pillars translate into five concrete steps:



  • Score every candidate platform against the guidance. Build a written matrix covering portal MFA, encrypted tally safeguards, multi-key decryption, breach logging, image-capture prevention, encryption disclosures, code verification options, practice-ballot test runs, tamper alerts, credential observation procedures, transaction-log integrity, independent audits, written security policy documentation, and the full one-year archive contents listed by OLMS.

  • Adopt written rules before nominations open. Publish the election method, credential timeline, replacement-credential procedure, observer schedule, and support contacts in the approved election rules so that every candidate and member operates under the same disclosed terms.

  • Witness the controls in operation. Invite candidate observers to the pre-election practice test, the credential preparation review, and the tally procedures, and retain a sign-in sheet and observer log for the one-year archive.

  • Document everything. The written security policy, vendor attestations, independent audit results, log exports, and retention schedule become the defensible record if a Title IV complaint is filed.

  • Preserve member choice and accessibility. Announce the alternate voting option for members without internet access, test the platform's accessibility with actual members or assistive technology before voting begins, and keep a documented support log.


For example, a mid-sized labor union that transitions from mail ballots to an online platform can satisfy its observer obligations by combining traditional observation of the eligibility list with third-party-audited platform controls, practice-ballot testing witnessed by candidates' observers, and contemporaneous tamper alerting — but only when every step is documented in writing before voting begins.


If you are planning an upcoming officer election, you can explore the union officer elections approach, review labor union industry guidance, consult the election operations overview, and examine online voting platform capabilities.



Frequently Asked Questions


Does OLMS approve or certify voting vendors?


No. OLMS does not endorse any auditor, nor has it sought to validate the code of any particular system. The agency does not certify vendors or maintain an approved-products list. It evaluates elections case by case when a complaint is filed under 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).


Can a union use telephone voting under the OLMS guidance?


Yes. The guidance expressly includes remote electronic voting from telephones within its scope, alongside remote computer-based internet voting, and subjects both to the same secret-ballot, observer, safeguards, record-preservation, and right-to-vote expectations.


What must a union do for members who lack internet access?


Upon request, the union must provide union-provided internet access or an alternative voting method, and the overall election system must not create barriers for members with accessibility needs.


Are nominations and contract ratification votes covered by this guidance?


No. The guidance applies to union officer elections governed by Title IV of the LMRDA. Nominations are subject to separate LMRDA rules such as 29 U.S.C. § 481(e), while contract ratification votes and strike votes are governed primarily by the union's own constitution and bylaws, not by Title IV.


How long must election records be kept after an online election?


At least one year under 29 U.S.C. § 481(e). For remote electronic elections, OLMS explicitly includes electronic votes, eligibility lists, credentials, log files, time-stamped software code, encrypted ballot files, and tally results in the archive requirement.



The Bottom Line


The OLMS remote electronic-voting guidance does not promise unions an easy pass, but it gives them a remarkably clear roadmap. The unions that run defensible online elections are the ones that treat the guidance as a procurement and governance checklist from day one: verifiable secrecy controls, meaningful observer access, a complete one-year archive, accessibility safeguards, and written rules adopted before members cast a single vote.


If your union is preparing for an upcoming officer election, talk with Votem’s election compliance team before you set your election calendar. A planning review can help align your nomination notices, observer workflows, platform controls, and retention documentation with the requirements that matter most to OLMS.


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